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A STUDY OF AMBIGUITY: DOES
ILLINOIS LAW PERMIT INSURERS TO
SUBMIT EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO
RESOLVE INSURANCE POLICY
AMBIGUITIES?
Stanley C. Nardoni*

I. INTRODUCTION

I

nsurance law practitioners often hear that all ambiguities in
insurance policies are resolved in favor of insureds. It has been
said that “[t]he words, ‘the contract is to be construed against the
insurer’ comprise the most familiar expression in the reports of
insurance cases.” 1 Surprisingly, what this insurance ambiguity
rule means for Illinois policyholders is itself ambiguous. Illinois
appellate court opinions conflict on whether a court confronted
with ambiguous policy terms must interpret the policy in favor of
the insured as a matter of law or first allow the parties, including
the insurer, a chance to persuade the court of the proper
interpretation in light of evidence outside of the language of the
policy.
This article reviews authority on the insurance ambiguity
rule under the law of Illinois and elsewhere. It explains that
although the rule “purports to be an application” of the doctrine
of contra proferentem, that “general principle of contract law that
doubtful language is to be interpreted most strongly against the
party who used it in drafting the contract,” 2 the insurance
* Stanley C. Nardoni is an attorney in the insurance recovery practice
group of Reed Smith LLP. He is a counsel in the firm and practices in its
Chicago office. The views expressed in this article are his and not necessarily
those of Reed Smith LLP, its attorneys or its clients.
1
2 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:14 (3d ed. 2011).
2
COUCH, supra note 1, § 22:14.
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ambiguity rule is much stronger. Under general contract law, the
interpretation of an ambiguous agreement is deemed to present a
question of fact for resolution with evidence extrinsic to the
contract, sometimes called parol evidence. 3 Contra proferentem is
employed as a tie-breaker to pick a winner if the extrinsic
evidence fails to persuade the factfinder of either side’s
interpretation. The insurance ambiguity rule, on the other hand,
construes policy ambiguities against the insurer as a matter of
law in the first instance.
The article concludes that, although the Illinois Supreme
Court has not explicitly discussed the varying approaches
appellate court cases have taken, its holdings have embraced the
strict insurance ambiguity rule. Courts applying Illinois law
should take the Illinois Supreme Court’s decisions into account
when confronting insurer offers of extrinsic evidence.

II. CONTRA PROFERENTEM UNDER GENERAL
CONTRACT LAW
Under general contract law, the interpretation of a written
contract may present issues of both fact and law, depending on
the clarity of the agreement. The initial review is conducted by
the judge hearing the case. If the judge sees no doubt as to the
contract’s meaning, he or she will interpret it as a matter of law. 4
3
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vigo Coal Co., Inc., 393 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir.
2004) (“evidence outside the contract . . . is, extrinsic evidence”); Duval Motors
Co. v. Rogers, 73 So. 3d 261, 265 (Fla. App. 2011) (“[E]vidence outside the
contract language . . . is known as parol evidence.”).
4
5-24 ARTHUR L. CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.30 (2012)
(“If, then, the words of the agreement, whether oral or written, are definite and
undisputed, and if there is no doubt as to the relevant surrounding
circumstances, the interpretation of the words is ordinarily held to be a matter
for the court. . . . The decision as to whether a contract is ambiguous is made
by the court.”). See also Gryce v. Lavine, 675 A.2d 67, 69 (D.C. 1996)
(“Whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court.”);
Richard Feiner & Co. Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 941 N.Y.S.2d 157, 161
(App. Div. 2012) (“Of course, the matter of whether the contract is ambiguous
is a question of law for the court.”); Gawryluk v. Poynter, 654 N.W.2d 400, 404
(N.D. 2002) (“Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the
court to decide.”); Hawkins v. Greenwood Development Corp., 493 S.E.2d 875,
879 (S.C. App. 1997) (“It is a question of law for the court whether the
language of a contract is ambiguous.”); J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128
S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003) (“Deciding whether a contract is ambiguous is a
question of law for the court.”).
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If, on the other hand, the judge believes the contract can
reasonably be understood multiple ways, the agreement will be
deemed ambiguous, and its interpretation will be treated as a
question of fact to be decided by a jury or the judge sitting as
factfinder. 5 The factfinder will be allowed to consider extrinsic
evidence such as communications between the parties that led up
to the formation of the contract, acts reflecting what the parties
understood it to mean, and trade usage, all in an effort to decide
what the parties intended in entering into the agreement. 6
5
CORBIN, supra note 4 § 24.30 (“The weighing of this evidence and the
determination of the inferences to be drawn—the interpretation—is for the
jury or other trier of the facts, once the court has determined that ambiguity
exists. . . . If the only issue presented by the conflicting evidence is the
interpretation of language, it is a question of fact with which no question of
law is ‘mixed.’”); Med. Ctr. of Cent. Georgia v. Denon Digital Employee
Benefit Plan, No. 5:03CV32 (DF), 2005 WL 1630017, at *3 (M.D. Ga. July 11,
2005) (“[W]here a contract is ambiguous, its interpretation is a matter for the
jury [i.e. the factfinder]. Since this case was tried without a jury, the Court, in
this instance, serves as the factfinder”); Bishop Trust Co., Ltd. v. Cent. Union
Church of Honolulu, 656 P.2d 1353, 1356 (1983) (“Where the language of the
contract is ambiguous, so that there is some doubt as to the intent of the
parties, that intent is a question of fact.”); Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency,
Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447, 453-54 (Mich. 2003) (“It is well settled that the meaning
of an ambiguous contract is a question of fact that must be decided by the
jury.”); Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Casella Waste Management of Mass.,
Inc., 945 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Mass. App. 2011) (“Once a contractual ambiguity
emerges, the meaning of the uncertain provision becomes a question of fact for
the trier.”).
6
CORBIN, supra note 4 § 24.30. See also Elda Arnhold and Byzantio,
L.L.C. v. Ocean Atlantic Woodland Corp., 284 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2002)
(“When considering extrinsic evidence, the factfinder should focus, in
descending order of importance, on: (1) the parties’ negotiations over the
contract at issue; (2) their course of performance; (3) their prior course of
dealing; and (4) trade usage in the relevant industry.”); Cent. Heights Imp. Co.
v. Mem’l Parks, 105 P.2d 596, 605 (Cal. App. 1940) (“The trial court
admitted . . . parol and extrinsic evidence consisting of conversations between
the parties and Goodcell occurring before, during, and subsequent to the
execution of the agreement of April 14th. . . . The evidence was admissible . . .
for the purpose of aiding the court in ascertaining the true intent and meaning
of the language used there.”); Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Casella Waste
Mgmt. of Mass., Inc., 945 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Mass. App. 2011) (“Once a
contractual ambiguity emerges [. . . [t]he fact finder may then consult extrinsic
evidence including the circumstances of the formation of the agreement and
the intentions and objectives of the parties.”); L.L.C. v. Ream, 933 N.E.2d 819,
824 (Ohio App. 2010) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence may include (1) the circumstances
surrounding the parties at the time the contract was made, (2) the objectives

NardoniArticle (Do Not Delete)

2013

5/1/2013 9:01 PM

Insurance Policy Ambiguities in Illinois

381

Although general contract law recognizes the doctrine of
contra proferentem to deal with ambiguities, it is highly
restricted. The doctrine operates to interpret ambiguities against
whichever party drafted the agreement, but only where the
factfinder cannot interpret the agreement after considering the
extrinsic evidence. As one commentator explains:
In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is
generally preferred which operates against the party
who supplies the words or from whom a writing
otherwise proceeds . . . Where one party chooses the
terms of a contract, he is likely to provide more carefully
for the protection of his own interests than for those of
the other party. He is also more likely . . . to have reason
to know of uncertainties of meaning. Indeed, he may
leave meaning deliberately obscure, intending to decide
at a later date what meaning to assert. In cases of doubt,
therefore, so long as other factors are not decisive, there
is substantial reason for preferring the meaning of the
other party.
. . .
The “contra proferentem” rule has been described as
being applicable only as a last resort, when other
techniques of interpretation and construction have not
resolved the question of which of two or more possible
reasonable meanings the court should choose. One court
wrote that it is “a tie breaker” when there is no other
sound basis for choosing one contract interpretation
over another. 7
the parties intended to accomplish by entering into the contract, and (3) any
acts by the parties that demonstrate the construction they gave to their
agreement.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7
CORBIN, supra note 4 § 24.27 (2012) (footnotes omitted) (quoting from
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206, § 206 cmt a, and Pitcher v.
Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 870 F. Supp. 903, 915 (S.D. Ind. 1994), aff’d 93
F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 1996)). See also Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc.,
663 N.W.2d 447, 456-57 (Mich. 2003) (“[I]f, after the jury has applied all other
conventional means of contract interpretation and considered the relevant
extrinsic evidence, the jury is . . . unable to determine what the parties
intended, the jury should then construe the ambiguity against the drafter. . . .
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III. THE INSURANCE “AMBIGUITY RULE” EVOLVED
FROM CONTRA PROFERENTEM
Although it evolved from the contract doctrine of contra
proferentem, the insurance ambiguity rule is significantly
different in scope. “In contract law, contra proferentem is a
doctrine to be used as a last resort, as a way of breaking ties, but
in insurance law, it is used as a primary rule (perhaps even the
primary rule) of interpretation for insurance policies.” 8 A federal
court applying Delaware law summarized this difference in
approach as follows:
Normally, in contract actions, analyzing contract
disputes is potentially a two step process; first, the court
determines whether the contractual language is
ambiguous as a matter of law. If the Court finds as a
matter of law that a contract is ambiguous, the fact
finder must then determine which conflicting
interpretation of the contract reflects the parties’ intent.
Thus, under usual contract principles, if the Court finds
ambiguity in a contract provision, the ambiguity raises
an issue of fact which must be resolved at trial, thereby
precluding summary judgment.
The rule of contra proferentem is a rule of last resort because” it does not
operate as an aid to identify the intent of the parties but as “‘a rule of legal
effect’ . . . to ascertain the winner and the loser in connection with a contract
whose meaning has eluded the jury despite all efforts to apply . . . conventional
rules of interpretation, including an examination of relevant extrinsic
evidence.”); Garment v. Zoeller, No. 97CIV7175(LAP), 2001 WL 708895, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2001) (“Contra proferentem provides that where extrinsic
evidence is conclusory or does not shed light upon the intent of the parties, a
court may construe any ambiguities in a contract against the drafter as a
matter of law. However, as in the present case, ‘where the relevant extrinsic
evidence offered “raises a question of credibility or presents a choice among
reasonable inferences” the construction of the ambiguous terms of the contract
is a question of fact which precludes the application of the contra proferentem
rule.’”), aff’d, 35 Fed. Appx. 22 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting from Morgan Stanley
Group, Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 36 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609 (S.D.N.Y.1999),
and Alfin, Inc. v. Pacific Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 115, 199 (S.D.N.Y.1990)).
8
1 JEFFREY E. THOMAS AND FRANCIS J. MOOTZ, III, NEW APPLEMAN
ON INSURANCE LAW § 5.02 (Library ed. 2009) (footnote omitted). See also Scott
G. Johnson, Resolving Ambiguities in Insurance Policy Language, 33 WTR
Brief 33, 33 (2004) [hereinafter Johnson] (The ambiguity rule is “used as an
interpretive rule of first resort in insurance contract disputes”).
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In the insurance context, however, Delaware courts
have formulated special rules of contract construction
which differ from those applied to most other contracts.
If there is any ambiguity in the policy, it must be
resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurer
that drafted the policy. When presented squarely with
ambiguous insurance provisions at summary judgment,
Delaware courts have adhered to this rule of contra
proferentem, consistently construing ambiguities in
favor of the insured as a matter of law. 9
The evolution from contra proferentem to the insurance
ambiguity rule accompanied the standardization of insurance
policies. According to one review of the relevant history:
Insurance contracts used to be construed much as other
business contracts, but this changed when insurance
policies became mass-marketed. Unlike a negotiated
business contract, these insurance policies used
standardized language drafted by the insurer and
effectively
became
“contracts
of
adhesion.”
Policyholders typically had no bargaining power and no
effective means of changing the terms of the insurance
contract. The courts’ logical reaction to this was to place
the onus of ambiguous terms on the insurers, because
they had the better bargaining position and were in a
better position to avoid the ambiguity. 10
Insurance coverage disputes became particularly
distinguished from all other contract cases as the market for
homeowner’s fire insurance grew and disputes over the scope of
that coverage increased. 11 “Since fire insurance policies were most
often drafted by over-bearing insurance companies, courts began
to feel justified in applying contra proferentem against the
insurers without first exhausting all other interpretive tools.” 12
The rationale was then extended to other types of insurance. By
“the time insurance law was recognized as sufficiently distinct
Oglesby v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D. Del. 1994)
(citations omitted).
10
Johnson, supra note 8, at 33.
11
David S. Miller, Note: Insurance as Contract: The Argument for
Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1850 (1988).
12
Id. at 1852.
9
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from contract law to warrant its own treatise” in the nineteenth
century, “contra proferentem had become known as the
‘ambiguity rule.’” 13
Today, states differ on how forcefully they apply contra
proferentem in the insurance context. Many states have chosen to
adhere to the general contract law approach, viewing the
interpretation of ambiguous insurance policies as a question of
fact, 14 with contra proferentem retained as a last resort where
considering extrinsic evidence failed to determine party intent. 15
Id.
See e.g., Hancock v. N.Y.York Life Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 1131, 1135 n.8
(11th Cir. 1990) (stating that under Alabama law, “[i]f an ambiguous and
unclear policy . . . can be construed only with the aid of evidence aliunde or
facts in pais, it is the province of the jury to ascertain those facts and draw
inferences therefrom.”); Western Line Consol. School Dist. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 632 F. Supp. 295, 301 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (“Once an ambiguity is
determined by the court to exist, the question of its meaning is one for the trier
of fact.”); E & S Facilities, Inc. v. Precision Chipper Corp., 565 So. 2d 54, 59
(Ala. 1990) (“As we have stated, the policy was ambiguous and those
ambiguities could be resolved only through evidence and facts outside the
document itself. . . . It was for the jury to examine the testimony of the parties
involved and to determine exactly what the parties intended.”); Elam v. First
Unum Life Ins. Co., 57 S.W.3d 165, 297 (Ark. 2001) (“Where . . . parol evidence
has been admitted to explain the meaning of the language, the determination
becomes one of fact for the jury to determine.”); New York v. Home Indem.
Co., 486 N.E.2d 827, 829 (N.Y. 1985) (“If . . . the language in the insurance
contract is ambiguous . . . the parties may submit extrinsic evidence as an aid
in construction, and the resolution of the ambiguity is for the trier of fact.”);
Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Wallis, 613 P.2d 36, 41 (Or. 1980) (“This court has
previously held that when the terms of an insurance policy are ambiguous, the
intention of the parties is a question of fact which should be submitted to and
decided by the jury as trier of the facts.”).
15
See e.g., Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617, 619 (Md. 1995)
(“Maryland does not follow the rule, adopted in many jurisdictions, that an
insurance policy is to be construed most strongly against the insurer.”
Nevertheless, “if no extrinsic or parol evidence is introduced, or if the
ambiguity remains after consideration of the extrinsic or parol evidence that is
introduced, it will be construed against the insurer as the drafter of the
instrument.”) (quoting Cheney v. Bell National Life, 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Md.
1989)) (citations omitted); Home Indem. Co., 486 N.E.2d at 829 (“Generally,
the courts bear the responsibility of determining the rights or obligations of
parties under insurance contracts based on the specific language of the policies.
If, however, the language in the insurance contract is ambiguous and
susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, the parties may submit extrinsic
evidence as an aid in construction, and the resolution of the ambiguity is for
the trier of fact. On the other hand, if the tendered extrinsic evidence is itself
13
14
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Still others hold to the strict version of the insurance ambiguity
rule, thereby automatically interpreting ambiguities against the
insurer.16

IV. AMBIGUITY IN ILLINOIS
Outside of the insurance context, at least, Illinois courts
clearly apply the tie-breaker approach to resolving contractual
ambiguities. In Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Whitlock, 17 in
reviewing a summary judgment that interpreted a contractual
release, the Illinois Supreme Court held:
A release is a contract, and therefore is governed by
contract law. The intention of the parties to contract
must be determined from the instrument itself, and
construction of the instrument where no ambiguity
exists is a matter of law. A contract will be considered

conclusory and will not resolve the equivocality of the language of the
contract, the issue remains a question of law for the court. Under those
circumstances, the ambiguity must be resolved against the insurer which
drafted the contract.”) (citations omitted).
16
“Jurisdictions that use modern contra proferentem to automatically
construe policy ambiguities in favor of coverage include New Jersey, Indiana
(at least as to patent ambiguities), and Texas.” 1 DAVID L. LEITNER, REGAN
W. SIMPSON & JOHN M. BJORKMAN, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE
COVERAGE LITIGATION § 1:11 (2012) (footnotes omitted). See e.g., Carrizales
v. State Farm Lloyds, 518 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying Texas law)
(“Ambiguities in insurance contracts giving rise to two reasonable
interpretations, one providing and the other denying coverage, are read contra
proferentem and in favor of the insured. . . . Ambiguity is a question of law for
the court.”); Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 107 F.3d 451,
457 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Under Indiana law, when an ambiguity is patent,
meaning it arises from within the document itself and cannot be resolved by
reference to the document, the court may not consider extrinsic evidence in
resolving the ambiguity.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fermahin, 836
P.2d 1074, 1077 (Haw. 1992) (“Because insurance contracts are contracts of
adhesion, they must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and all
ambiguities are resolved against the insurer.”); Adams Golf, Inc. v. T & F,
LLC, No. 07 L 010766, 2011 WL 6933718 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill.)(applying
Texas law) (“The Court finds that . . . the language in the notice provision is
ambiguous. Based on the arguments, evidence and the Texas Supreme Court
cases . . . the language in the contract must be strictly interpreted against the
insurer. The Court cannot look to extrinsic evidence where the language is
ambiguous.”).
17
Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Whitlock, 581 N.E.2d 664 (Ill. 1991).
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ambiguous if it is capable of being understood in more
sense than one. Where a court determines that a
contract is ambiguous, its construction is then a
question of fact, and parol evidence is admissible to
explain and ascertain what the parties intended. 18
The supreme court decided that the release was
ambiguous in failing to make clear whether it extended to one or
two loans. In light of that ambiguity, the court reversed the
summary judgment that had been entered against the bank and
remanded for interpretation as a matter of fact. 19 Without
suggesting that the release should be construed against its drafter,
the court held:
[W]e conclude that the parties’ intent must be
determined from an examination of extrinsic evidence
by the trier of fact.
In granting a motion for summary judgment it is
improper for the court to speculate in order to determine
the parties’ intent, as the courts below have done.
Caution must be exercised in granting summary
judgment so as not to preempt the right of a party to
present the factual basis of his case to the fact finder. 20
In line with this reasoning, Illinois courts have consistently
held that where terms of a contract are ambiguous, extrinsic
evidence is admissible to determine party intent as a question of
fact. 21 Intent will then be decided by a jury or a judge sitting as
Id. at 667 (citations omitted).
Id. at 665-67.
20
Id. at 667.
21
See, e.g., Highland Supply Corp. v. Illinois Power Co., 973 N.E.2d 551,
558 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“In construing a contract, the court’s primary focus is
to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties. If no ambiguity exists in
a contract, its construction is a question of law. However, “[w]here a court
determines that a contract is ambiguous, its construction is then a question of
fact, and parol evidence is admissible to explain and ascertain what the parties
intended.”) (citation omitted); Bradley Real Estate Trust v. Dolan Assocs. Ltd.,
640 N.E.2d 9, 11-12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“If the language is ambiguous,
extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine the parties’ intent and the
interpretation of the language is a question of fact.”); see also Air Safety, Inc. v.
Teachers Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 882, 884 (Ill. 1999) (“If . . . the trial court
finds that the language of the contract is susceptible to more than one
18
19
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factfinder. 22 A judge’s interpretation as factfinder will be
reviewed on a manifest weight of the evidence standard rather
than the de novo standard applicable to interpreting
unambiguous contracts. 23 Contra proferentem is a last resort if
meaning, then an ambiguity is present. Only then may parol evidence be
admitted to aid the trier of fact in resolving the ambiguity.”) Hubbard Street
Lofts LLC v. Inland Bank, 963 N.E.2d 262, 317-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“It is
well established that if a contract is ambiguous, it presents a question of fact
and cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss.”); Quake Const., Inc. v.
American Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990, 994 (Ill. 1990) (“If the language of an
alleged contract is ambiguous regarding the parties’ intent, the interpretation
of the language is a question of fact which a circuit court cannot properly
determine on a motion to dismiss.”); Chicago Inv. Corp. v. Dolins, 418 N.E.2d
59, 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“If the court should find that the document’s
language is ambiguous, and thus that construction of its meaning is a question
of fact, it is improper to utilize a section 45 motion [to dismiss] to resolve the
matter.”) (citation omitted).
22
See, e.g., Nat’l Tea Co. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 456 N.E.2d
206, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (“Thus, only if the contract is ambiguous and the
extrinsic facts necessary to determine the parties’ interpretation thereof are in
controversy should the question of interpretation be left to a jury.”) (citation
omitted); Nerone v. Boehler, 340 N.E.2d 534, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (“When
the court has determined that an ambiguity exists in the contract, evidence of
prior and contemporaneous transactions and other extrinsic facts may be
introduced by the parties and considered by the court in ascertaining the true
meaning of the contract. . . . [I]f the extrinsic facts and circumstances are
controverted or if the meaning of the contract is uncertain in light of the
extrinsic evidence, then the intent of the parties to the contract must be
determined as a question of fact by the jury or by the court in a trial without a
jury.”) (citations omitted); Vole, Inc. v. Georgacopolous, 538 N.E.2d 205, 211
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“Whereas in the instant case, the construction to be placed
on an agreement is dependent not only upon the meaning of the words
employed, but also upon extrinsic facts and circumstances, and upon the
construction which the parties themselves have placed upon the agreement,
and as these facts are controverted, any inferences to be drawn are for the trier
of fact.”); see also Bank of Ravenswood v. Polan, 628 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (“Extrinsic evidence may be introduced to show the intent of
the parties and resolve an ambiguity in a contract. If the intent of the parties
can be determined from facts not in dispute, then the meaning of the contract
can be determined by the court as a matter of law. But if the ambiguity can
only be resolved by resort to facts in dispute, then the contract must be
construed by the trier of fact.”) (citations omitted).
23
See, e.g., InsureOne Indep. Ins. Agency, LLC v. Hallberg, 2012 IL App
(1st) 092385 ¶ 101 (“A trial court interprets the meaning of clear and
unambiguous contract terms as a matter of law, and its interpretation is
subject to de novo review.”); Lease Mgmt. Equip. Corp. v. DFO P’ship, 910
N.E.2d 709, 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (“Where the language of a contract is clear
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the factfinder cannot decide on an interpretation. 24
In the insurance context, on the other hand, although they
generally say that insurance policies are controlled by the same
rules of construction as other contracts, Illinois courts have
spoken of contra proferentem more forcefully. In International
Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., for
example, the Illinois Appellate Court stated:
Contracts of insurance are subject to the same rules of
construction applicable to other types of contracts. The
paramount objective is to give effect to the intent of the
parties as expressed by the terms of the agreement. If
the language of the policy is ambiguous or otherwise
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation,
it will be construed in favor of the insured, under the
doctrine of contra proferentem requiring that
ambiguities be strictly construed against the drafter of
the instrument. 25
Despite the apparent strength of this statement, Illinois
appellate court decisions have conflicted on when contra
and unambiguous, construction of the contract is a matter of law subject to de
novo review.”); Bunge Corp. v. N. Trust Co., 623 N.E.2d 785, 791 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (“If the terms of an alleged contract are ambiguous or are capable of
more than one interpretation, parol evidence is admissible to ascertain the
parties’ intent. . . . Factual determinations regarding the meaning of contract
language should not be overturned unless they are contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence.”).
24
See, e.g., William Blair & Co., LLC v. FI Liquidation Corp., 830
N.E.2d 760, 777-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“Moreover, Spectra correctly points
out that contra proferentem is a secondary rule of interpretation that should be
invoked only after ‘ordinary interpretive guides have been exhausted.’
Thus, . . . Blair’s invocation of contra proferentem is, at best, premature
because as this case was decided by the circuit court on summary judgment,
there has not yet been any attempt to resolve the ambiguity through the
‘ordinary interpretive guides’—namely, a consideration of the extrinsic
evidence.”) (citations omitted); City of Chicago v. Dickey, 497 N.E.2d 390, 39394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (“[T]he circuit court explicitly found that the instrument
was ambiguous on the question of the parties’ intent. This finding necessitated
resort, not to the doctrine of contra proferentem or the summary judgment
mechanism, but to an evidentiary hearing on the parties’ intent. . . . [T]he court
erred in applying the doctrine without first permitting the parties an
opportunity to present extrinsic evidence.”).
25
International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
522 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
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proferentem applies in the insurance context. While cases
favoring either the tie-breaker or the strict ambiguity rule exist,
the Illinois Supreme Court’s decisions indicate that the latter rule
should be followed in insurance cases.
A. Some Appellate Opinions Apply The General Contract
Approach In Insurance Cases
An Illinois appellate court applied the general contract
law approach to an insurance case in LaSalle Nat’l Insurance Co.
v. Executive Auto Leasing Co. 26 There, the parties disputed the
interpretation of the term “gross receipts” in an insurance policy’s
retrospective premium endorsement. The endorsement did not
expressly state what the parties meant by the term, and the
contractual definition was “susceptible of either LaSalle’s or
Executive’s construction.” 27 The agreement was thus ambiguous
because “the words used by the parties are fairly susceptible of
being understood in more than one sense.” 28 Citing general
contract cases rather than insurance decisions, the court stated:
In the construction of a contract the determining factor
is the intention of the parties. If possible, the intention
must be ascertained from the language employed in the
contract but if this is impossible, the language may be
explained by extrinsic evidence so that the true
intention of the parties may be learned.
The present policy requires extrinsic evidence to ascertain
the intent of the parties at the time they entered into it.
Admissible facts and circumstances surrounding the making of
the contract, the interpretation placed upon it by the parties
contemporaneously with its making or by their performance
under its terms, acts by one party which may have indicated
acceptance of the other’s interpretation, may aid the court or jury
in reaching the correct construction. The ambiguity of the policy
created a genuine issue of material fact. 29
The trial court had entered summary judgment for the
insurer, but the appellate court agreed with Executive Auto
LaSalle Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Executive Auto Leasing Co., 257 N.E.2d 508
(Ill. App. Ct. 1970).
27
Id. at 512.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 512-13 (citations omitted).
26
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Leasing Co.’s contention that summary judgment was improper
in the circumstances, and the case had to be remanded for a trial,
instead. 30
Judge Richard A. Posner of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that the LaSalle
National case means Illinois follows the tie-breaker approach in
insurance cases. 31 In Harbor Insurance Company v. Continental
Bank Corporation, which dealt with director and officer liability
insurance as well as a dispute over the meaning of “indemnity” in
the bank’s charter, his opinion for the court stated:
30
LaSalle Nat’l Ins. Co., 257 N.E.2d at 513. Other Illinois Appellate Court
cases have similarly expressed openness to considering extrinsic evidence to
resolve policy ambiguities, but most saw no need to do so because they judged
the policy unambiguous. E.g., Westfield Ins. Co. v. FCL Builders, Inc., 948
N.E.2d 115, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“We may only consider extrinsic evidence
outside of the contract if the contract is ambiguous. The policy provision in
this case is not ambiguous. . .”) (citation omitted); Sharp v. Trans Union
L.L.C., 845 N.E.2d 719, 726-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“The court may look to
extrinsic materials only where the policy’s language is ambiguous. . . . The
language of exclusion (g) is not ambiguous.”) (citation omitted); CNA Cas. v.
E.C. Fackler, Inc., 836 N.E.2d 732, 736 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“[I]f the court finds
that the language of the Policy is susceptible to more than one meaning . . . we
may consider parol evidence to resolve the ambiguity . . . [but] the plain
language of the insolvency exclusion at issue” bars coverage if certain facts
occur) (citation omitted); Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 812 N.E.2d 741, 749 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004) (“Because we conclude that the meaning of the policy can be
determined on the face of the policy, it is unnecessary to consider the extrinsic
documents . . .”); Pre-Fab Transit Co. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 600
N.E.2d 866, 869, 871 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“If the terms of an alleged contract
are ambiguous or capable of more than one interpretation, parol evidence is
admissible to ascertain the parties’ intent. . . . We conclude that the
retrospective premium endorsement in the present case is unambiguous . . .”)
(citation omitted); Seeburg Corp. v. United Founders Life Ins. Co., 403 N.E.2d
503, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (“[I]f the terms are ambiguous and uncertain, the
court should consider extrinsic matters,” though the policy was “clear and
unambiguous”). At least one case concluded that extrinsic evidence supported
the insurer’s reading of the policy but ruled in favor of coverage anyway
because “the principles of insurance contract construction” required it to
interpret an ambiguous coverage rejection form against the insurer. Carroll
Tiling Serv. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Ill., 796 N.E.2d 702, 708-10 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003). Another court recited that extrinsic evidence is permissible to resolve
ambiguities but relied on case law to construe the policy. Where it found
endorsement language “[a]t best” ambiguous, it held any such “ambiguity must
be resolved . . . in favor of coverage.” University of Ill. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1345-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
31
Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 366 (7th Cir. 1990).
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The charter is ambiguous, and therefore testimony,
including expert testimony-including in suitable cases
testimony by a lawyer-was a permissible aid to
interpretation. This is black-letter law, and neither side
questions it. And yet it might seem to jostle with the
familiar principle of interpretation, as well established
in Illinois as anywhere, that ambiguities in insurance
contracts are to be resolved against the insurance
company. Given this rule-if there is an ambiguity, the
insured wins-why would there ever be an occasion for
attempting to resolve an ambiguity in an insurance
contract by evidence? Yet that is exactly what was done
in LaSalle National Ins. Co. v. Executive Auto Leasing
Co. Reconciliation is possible along the following lines.
If an insurance contract is ambiguous either party
should be allowed to introduce evidence to
disambiguate it. But if, all such evidence having been
considered, the meaning of the contract is still uncertain,
then the insured wins. In other words, the interpretive
principle (favor the insured) is merely a tie-breaker. 32
In line with this view, a federal district court judge
recently looked to extrinsic evidence to interpret an exclusion she
deemed ambiguous. 33 The extrinsic evidence included expert
testimony offered by the insured on the meaning of a policy
phrase that was a “term of art.” 34 The judge issued summary
Id. at 365-6 (citations omitted). Judge Posner repeated his
understanding of the rule in opinions for the court in Stone Container v.
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 165 F.3d 1157, 1161 (7th Cir.
1999) (“[T]he rule that ambiguities in insurance contracts are to be resolved in
favor of the insured comes into play only after the insurance company has had
an opportunity to present evidence designed to dispel the ambiguity.”), and
Rhone-Poulenc Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 71 F.3d 1299, 1305 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“[A]lthough ambiguities in insurance contracts are to be resolved against the
insurer, this principle comes into play only after reasonable efforts at
interpretation have failed, including the taking of evidence concerning the
drafting or negotiation of the contract.”).
33
Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Merge Healthcare Solutions, Inc., No. 11 C
3844, 2012 WL 1532266, *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2012). The court cited Illinois
general contract case law in deciding that “[b]ecause the contract language is
ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’
intent.” Id. (citing Ancraft Prods. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 427 N.E.2d
585, 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
34
Id. at *3.
32
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judgment in favor of the insured based on the insured’s
interpretation of the term of art and because the insurer
“present[ed] no evidence supporting its suggested reading of the
policy.” 35
B. Other Appellate Opinions Employ the Insurance Ambiguity
Rule
A contrary approach was taken by another Illinois
appellate court panel in Aguilar v. Safeway Insurance Co. 36
There, the insureds sued their uninsured motorist carrier claiming
that their insurance company’s policy required them to file suit if
they wanted the insurance company to reimburse their costs. 37
They urged that a policy provision saying that a “suit seeking
recovery” under the uninsured motorist coverage section “must be
filed within two years of the accident” created an ambiguity in
the policy. 38 They claimed that this language could be read to
require them to sue uninsured motorists. 39 Having done so, they
claimed they were entitled to reimbursement for their costs of
bringing that litigation.40 The insurer, on the other hand, claimed
the language limited the insureds’ time to sue the insurer not the
uninsured motorist. 41 A trial judge accepted the insurer’s reading
of the policy on its face and dismissed the insureds’ complaint
with prejudice for failing to state a cause of action. 42
The appellate court disagreed. Reading the two-year suit
provision in light of other parts of the policy, it concluded that the
language was subject to different interpretations. 43 Because it was
“ambiguous as a matter of law,” the court interpreted the
language in favor of the insured.44 Remanding with directions to
reinstate the complaint, it explained:
In light of those ambiguities, we are compelled to
construe the policy as against the defendant-drafter of
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id.
Aguilar v. Safeway Ins. Co., 157 Ill.App.3d 877, 1135 (Ill.App. 1987).
Id.
Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1136.
Id.
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1137.
Id.
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the policy. Such construction leads to the inevitable
conclusion that defendant, by the terms of the policy as
alleged in the complaint, required plaintiffs to file suit
against the uninsured motorists. As further alleged in
the complaint, by requiring the initiation of those law
suits, defendant has become obligated to reimburse
plaintiffs for court costs associated with those cases. 45
One member of the panel dissented. He agreed that the
policy language was ambiguous, but he claimed it was too soon to
resolve that ambiguity against the insurer. The dissenter
maintained:
Because . . . an appeal from a dismissal for failure to
state a cause of action preserves for review only the
legal sufficiency of the complaint and since the
resolution of an ambiguity presents a factual questions,
the majority having found the language ambiguous
should have vacated the judgment and remanded for
further proceedings which would include the resolution
of the ambiguity in which parol evidence would be
admissible to explain and ascertain the meaning of the
language in question…. However, instead of vacatur
and remandment as suggested above, the majority has
resolved the ambiguity, a factual determination, in
favor of plaintiffs, and in so doing has improperly
predetermined the liability of the defendant without
giving it the opportunity to negate allegations in the
complaint or to assert possible policy defenses. 46
Read in light of the dissent, the Aguilar case presents an
approach to resolving ambiguity directly opposite from the one
taken in in LaSalle National.
A longtime practitioner of Illinois insurance law recently
described that strict ambiguity rule as the dominant one in
Illinois. Writing in the Illinois Bar Journal, Jack Leyhane, a
Chicago attorney with decades of experience in the representation
of insurance carriers and others in significant coverage
litigation, 47 observed:
45
46
47

Id.
Id. at 1138 (Sullivan, J. dissenting).
E.g., John Burns Const. Co. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 700 N.E.2d 763 (Ill.
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Whether a contract is ambiguous is determined as a
matter of law. If a contract is found to be ambiguous,
depending on the type of contract being construed, parol
evidence may be admissible to ascertain the true intent
of the contracting parties. (Although insurance policies
are ordinarily construed like any other contract, they are
different from other contracts in this important respect:
If an insurance contract is determined to be ambiguous,
it will be strictly construed against the insurer, the
drafter of the policy.)
. . .
It has been said that every contract is written for three
parties: The party of the first part, the party of the
second part, and the judge or arbitrator who must
decide which of the other two is in breach. This is of
particular import in the law of insurance, because if a
court cannot understand what a policy means in a given
instance, whether a competing interpretation is offered
or not, it may well conclude that the provision is
ambiguous because it is “obscure in meaning through
indefiniteness of expression.” Because the insurer cannot
bring in parol evidence in that situation to explain what
it meant to say, the insurer may be unable, as a matter
of law, to enforce or rely upon the disputed policy
provision.48
C. The Illinois Supreme Court Applies the Insurance Ambiguity
Rule
The Illinois Supreme Court has not expressly stated
whether insurers are permitted to offer extrinsic evidence to
interpret ambiguous insurance policies. The closest it seems to
have come to addressing the point was a footnote rejecting the
App. Ct. 1998), rev’d, 727 N.E.2d 211 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (establishing Illinois’
unique “targeted tender” rule); Indiana Ins. Co. v. Liaskos, 697 N.E.2d 398 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1998); Lyon v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 566 N.E.2d 388 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990); LaSalle Nat. Bank v. Allstate Ins. Co., 519 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987).
48
Jack Leyhane, The Two Faces of Contract Ambiguity Claims, 100 ILL.
BAR J. 264, 267 (2012) (footnotes omitted) (quoting from Platt v. Gateway
Intern. Motorsports Corp., 813 N.E.2d 279, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)).
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insureds’ offer of an insurer document to interpret language the
court deemed unambiguous in Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. 49
A study of the way the Illinois Supreme Court has
resolved insurance policy ambiguities, however, reflects that it
employs the strict insurance ambiguity rule rather than the
general contract law approach. That it favors the strict ambiguity
rule is evidenced by three facts. First, the court has repeatedly
prescribed the rule for resolving ambiguities without referencing
any potential for extrinsic evidence. Second, the court identifies
insurance policy interpretation as exclusively a question of law
even when ambiguities are involved. Finally, the court has
resolved ambiguities against insurers on the pleadings pursuant
to motions that did not allow submission of extrinsic evidence.
Each of these points is discussed below.
1. The Court Phrases the Rule Without Suggesting Submission
of Extrinsic Evidence
The Illinois Supreme Court summarized the basic rules of
insurance policy construction in Gillen v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company:
Our primary objective when construing an insurance
policy is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
Avery v. State Farm mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005).
The supreme court observed that “[a]bsent a finding” that a policy promise
was “ambiguous, such extrinsic evidence is irrelevant to the meaning of this
contractual provision. . . . We make no such finding of ambiguity.” Id. at 828
n.5. It is not clear that the court was saying that extrinsic evidence is
necessarily proper to interpret insurance policies or that insurers would be
allowed to present such evidence. The court cited two prior decisions, but
neither held extrinsic evidence admissible to resolve policy ambiguities.
Grzeszczak v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 659 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ill. 1995)
(refusing insured widow’s attempt to rely on rule of construction known as
“the premium rule” where the antistacking provisions of underinsured motorist
coverage were unambiguous); Dempsey v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 88
N.E.2d 874, 876 (Ill. 1949) (saying merely that policy and its attachments
“must be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the
parties have used, and if the language is clear and unambiguous it must be
taken and understood according to its plain, ordinary and popular sense”). The
first case actually considered it “well established that if an insurance clause is
ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the insured.” Grzeszczak, 659
N.E.2d at 956.
49
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the parties, as expressed in the policy language. The
construction we give to an insurance policy should be a
natural and reasonable one. Undefined terms will be
given their plain, ordinary and popular meaning, i.e.,
they will be construed with reference to the average,
ordinary, normal, reasonable person. If the policy
language is susceptible to more than one reasonable
meaning, it is considered ambiguous and will be
construed against the insurer. Importantly, a policy
provision that purports to exclude or limit coverage will
be read narrowly and will be applied only where its
terms are clear, definite, and specific. 50
The Illinois Supreme Court has said that it resolves
ambiguities against insurers “because there is little or no
bargaining involved in the insurance contracting process, the
insurer has control in the drafting process, and the policy’s
overall purpose is to provide coverage to the insured.” 51 It has
also observed that because third-parties injured by insureds must
rely on the insureds’ policies for compensation, public policy
warrants interpreting policies in favor of coverage. 52 The court
has firmly rejected the idea that large sophisticated policyholders
should lack the protection of the insurance ambiguity rule. 53 The
court’s recitation of the rule without reference to extrinsic
evidence and its reasons for holding to the rule suggest the court
does not contemplate the admission of extrinsic evidence from
insurers to reduce the scope of coverage.

Id. at 582 (citation omitted).
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204,
1217 (Ill. 1992).
52
State Security Ins. Co. v. Burgos, 583 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ill. 1991) (“In the
context of liability insurance policies, public policy considerations also dictate
that a liberal construction in favor of coverage be applied as the recovery of an
injured third party is involved.”).
53
Id.; Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1218-19 (“The insurance industry
is powerful and closely knit. As evidenced by the CGL policies in the instant
case, most policies are standard-form, are worded very similarly, and are
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Any insured, whether large and
sophisticated or not, must enter into a contract with the insurer which is
written according to the insurer’s pleasure by the insurer. Generally, since little
or no negotiation occurs in this process, the insurer has total control of the
terms and the drafting of the contract. This rule of construction recognizes,
inter alia, these facets of the insurance contracting process.”).
50
51
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2. The Court Views Interpretation as Always a Question of Law
In contrast with its approach for other types of contracts,
the Illinois Supreme Court has consistently identified insurance
policy interpretation as solely a question of law. Although a few
of its decisions have spoken of that as the rule for “unambiguous”
policies, 54 the typical formulation states that all policy
interpretation issues are questions of law.55 Even when reviewing
E.g., Roberts v. Northland Ins. Co., 705 N.E.2d 762, 764 (Ill. 1998)
(“The construction of an unambiguous insurance policy provision is a question
of law subject to de novo review.”); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Savickas, 739 N.E.2d 445, 448-49 (Ill. 2000) (“The construction of an
unambiguous insurance policy provision is a question of law, and the policy’s
terms are to be applied as written unless those terms contravene public
policy.”).
55
E.g., Pekin Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 930 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ill. 2010) (“[T]he
construction of the provisions of an insurance policy is a question of law for
which our review is de novo.); Schultz v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 930 N.E.2d
943, 948 (Ill. 2010) (“Construction of the terms of an insurance policy and
whether the policy comports with statutory requirements are questions of law
properly decided on a motion for summary judgment.”); Addison Ins. Co. v.
Fay, 905 N.E.2d 747, 751 (Ill. 2009) (“The construction of a provision of an
insurance policy is a question of law . . .”); Guillen v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill.,
785 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. 2003) (“The construction of an insurance policy, which is a
question of law, is also reviewed de novo”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Eljer Mfg.,
Inc., 757 N.E.2d 481, 491 (Ill. 2001) (“The construction of the provisions of an
insurance policy is . . . a question of law”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Villicana, 692 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ill. 1998) (“We begin our discussion by
noting that the construction of an insurance policy is a question of law”);
American States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ill. 1997) (“Finally, the
construction of an insurance policy is a question of law subject to de novo
review.”); Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d
842, 846 (Ill. 1995) (“The construction of an insurance policy and its provisions
is a question of law.”); Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1204 (“The
construction of an insurance policy’s provisions is a question of law.”); United
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Elder, 427 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ill. 1981) (“The sole
question is whether the Volkswagen was a replacement or an additional
vehicle as defined in the policy. That question is one of law, to be determined
by the court.”); Rockford Ins. Co. v. Storig, 24 N.E. 674, 674-75 (Ill. 1890) (“It
is to be premised that what is meant by the term ‘vacant and unoccupied,’ in a
policy of insurance, is a question of law, but whether the building was at the
time of the loss ‘vacant and unoccupied,’ within the meaning of the policy, is a
question of fact.”); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 92 Ill. 64, 70 (Ill. 1879) (“Now,
what is meant by the term vacant or unoccupied, in the connection in which it
occurs in the policy, is a question of law; but whether the house was, at the
time of the fire, within the meaning of the policy, vacant and unoccupied, was
a question of fact for the determination of the jury.”).
54
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an appellate decision that held an exclusion ambiguous, the
supreme court stressed that “the construction of an insurance
policy is a question of law subject to de novo review” and that all
ambiguous terms “will be construed strictly against the insurer
who drafted the policy.” 56 The court has explicitly held that
insurance policy interpretation is a matter “for the trial judge and
not for the jury.” 57
[W]ell settled rules of interpretation or construction
govern the court when it construes an insurance
contract . . . [I]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the
meaning of the language employed in the contract of
insurance, and the language is reasonably susceptible of
two meanings or interpretations, one of which is
favorable to the insured and the other to the insurance
company, the interpretation that favors the insured will
be adopted. 58
In Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 59 the
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the striking of a jury demand in
a suit for a declaratory judgment on insurance policies. The court
saw no place for a jury because the sole purpose of the insurer’s
complaint and the insured’s counterclaim were to obtain a
declaration of rights over the construction of the policies. These
were “questions of law, the determination of which rests
exclusively with the court,” leaving “no right to a jury trial on
either the complaint or the counterclaim.” 60
3. The Supreme Court Has Resolved Ambiguities on the
Pleadings Alone
Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court has itself resolved
insurance policy ambiguities without directing submission of
extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity. One example is
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust. 61 There,
the court affirmed rulings in a judgment on the pleadings that an
Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 74-75.
Treolo v. Iroquois Auto Ins. Underwriters, 180 N.E. 575, 576 (Ill. 1932).
58
Id. (citation omitted).
59
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 150, 166 (Ill. 1987).
60
Id.
61
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 708 N.E.2d 1122
(Ill. 1999).
56
57
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Arkansas action brought to enter a previously-signed consent
decree constituted a “suit” within the meaning of Wausau’s
promise “to defend any suit against the insured.” 62 The court
rejected an appellate court ruling that such an action was
insufficiently adversarial to qualify as a “suit” under Wausau’s
policy. 63 In refusing Wausau’s narrow interpretation of the term
“any suit,” the court held:
Even assuming, arguendo, that Wausau’s interpretation
of “any suit” is reasonable, at best it would create an
ambiguity in the policy language. “A policy provision is
ambiguous only if it is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation.” Wausau’s interpretation
would then compete with the definition of suit, set forth
above. Where competing reasonable interpretations of a
policy exist, a court is not permitted to choose which
interpretation it will follow. Rather, in such
circumstances, the court must construe the policy in
favor of the insured and against the insurer that drafted
the policy. Since Wausau’s interpretation affords less
coverage to Ehlco, we would be required to reject it.
Wausau’s argument thus fails in any event. 64
The court would not have said the disputed term could be
interpreted as a matter of law pursuant to a judgment on the
pleadings if extrinsic evidence must be considered before
applying the ambiguity rule. As the Ehlco court recognized,
judgment on the pleadings is proper only where “the admissions
in the pleadings disclose that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” 65 A judgment on the pleadings cannot issue where the
pleadings leave open material disputes of fact. 66 Illinois courts
Id. at 1129-31.
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 687 N.E.2d 82,
85-89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 708 N.E.2d 1122 (Ill.
1999).
64
Employers Ins., 708 N.E.2d at 1130 (citations omitted).
65
Id. at 1129 (quoting 3 R. MICHAEL, ILLINOIS PRACTICE § 27.2, at 494
(1989)).
66
Gillen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 830 N.E.2d 575, 577 (2005)
(“Judgment on the pleadings is proper where the pleadings disclose no genuine
issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court will
62
63

Nardoni Article (Do Not Delete)

400

Loyola Consumer Law Review

5/1/2013 9:01 PM

Vol. 25:4

may not even consider extrinsic evidence in deciding whether to
issue a judgment on the pleadings.67
The court again took a similar approach in Hoglund v.
State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co. 68 In Hoglund, the court
considered whether the setoff terms of policies providing
uninsured motorist coverage allowed the insurer credit for
payments by another insurer where an accident resulted from
negligence of insured and uninsured parties and the payment
from the insured tortfeasor failed to compensate for the insured’s
full damages. Relying on the policy language, a trial judge
granted judgment on the pleadings to State Farm. The Illinois
Supreme Court acknowledged that “a literal interpretation of the
policy language” allowed such a setoff, but it judged that those
terms were ambiguous when considered in light of the insured’s
reasonable expectations, the purpose of uninsured motorist
coverage, and the facts of the underlying cases. 69 That ambiguity
had to be resolved in favor of the insured as a matter of law. The
court thus held:
We have previously noted that the public policy behind
the uninsured motorist statute is to place the injured
party in substantially the same position he would be in
consider only those facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, matters
subject to judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the record.”) (citations
omitted); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Young, 968 N.E.2d 759, 763 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2012) (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings asserts the allegations in
the pleadings and the exhibits to the pleadings, which are considered part of
the pleadings, permit only one disposition as a matter of law. Judgment on the
pleadings is proper only if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”) (citations omitted).
67
See M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.-Luke’s Medical Center, 764
N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2001) (“In ruling upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
a court may consider only (1) facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, (2)
matters subject to judicial notice, and (3) judicial admissions in the record.
Extrinsic evidence may not be considered.”) (citation omitted); Romano v.
Village of Glenview, 660 N.E.2d 56, 61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (The motion
“attacks only defects apparent on the face of the complaint, and extrinsic
evidence cannot be considered”).
68
Hoglund v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 592 N.E.2d 1031 (Ill. 1992).
69
Id. at 1035 (The court spoke of those general circumstances as “extrinsic
evidence” showing the policy was ambiguous, but it did not suggest this
ambiguity called for extrinsic evidence as to what the policy terms meant to
resolve the ambiguity. On the contrary, it said that “any ambiguity in an
insurance policy must be construed in favor of coverage for the insured”).

NardoniArticle (Do Not Delete)

5/1/2013 9:01 PM

Insurance Policy Ambiguities in Illinois

2013

401

if the uninsured driver had been insured. If the position
of State Farm were to be adopted, however, this
purpose would be frustrated. If, for instance, the
uninsured motorcycle driver had been insured for
$100,000, Miss Hoglund could have collected that sum
in full from that driver’s insurer, along with the
$100,000 she collected from the other insured driver.
The separate collections of $100,000 from each of the
two culpable drivers would have fully compensated her
for her $200,000 in damages. State Farm’s position,
however, is to insist that it receive a full setoff for the
payment made on behalf of the insured driver. Such a
result would violate the public policy behind the
uninsured motorist statute that the injured party be
placed in the same position as if the uninsured driver
had been insured. Additionally, the insurance policies at
issue were intended to provide coverage for damages
caused by uninsured motorists. To allow a literal
interpretation of the policy language would nullify the
coverage intended by the policies. Further, to endorse
State Farm’s interpretation of the setoff provision
would deny the policyholder substantial economic value
in return for the payment of premiums. That is to say,
the insured would be denied the very insurance
protection against uninsured motorists for which he had
paid premiums.70
In light of those circumstances, the setoff provision was
ambiguous, and “[u]nder Illinois law, any ambiguity in an
insurance policy must be construed in favor of coverage for the
insured.” 71 The court therefore resolved the “ambiguity in these
setoff provisions in favor of coverage for the plaintiffs.” 72 As in
Ehlco, the court did not view insurance policy ambiguities as
creating a fact issue. Its approach in Hoglund and Ehlco stands in
stark contrast to the one it took for the non-insurance contract in
Farm Credit Bank discussed above, where it held that ambiguity
mandated resolution by a factfinder. 73

70
71
72
73

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
A careful analysis of its decisions shows that the Illinois
Supreme Court employs a strict version of the insurance
ambiguity rule. That strict version holds that once an ambiguity
is found in insurance policy language, a court will resolve it in
favor of the insured without first opening the question for
submission of extrinsic evidence to demonstrate an interpretation.
Under that approach, insurance policy interpretation is deemed
exclusively a question of law without reserving contra
proferentem as a rule of last resort. The Illinois Supreme Court
holds: “Where competing reasonable interpretations of a policy
exist, a court is not permitted to choose which interpretation it
will follow. Rather, in such circumstances, the court must
construe the policy in favor of the insured and against the insurer
that drafted the policy.” 74 Courts should not overlook this Illinois
Supreme Court authority when confronting an insurer’s offers of
extrinsic evidence to resolve policy ambiguities.

Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 708 N.E.2d
1122, 1130 (Ill. 1999).
74

